Related papers: Building social networks under consent: A survey
We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…
In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a…
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function…
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…
We study a network formation game where nodes wish to send traffic to other nodes. Nodes can contract bilaterally other nodes to form bidirectional links as well as nodes can break unilaterally contracts to eliminate the corresponding…
Network formation theory studies how agents create and maintain relationships, and the stability of those relationships with respect to individual incentives. A central stability concept in this literature is pairwise stability, introduced…
Social networks can sustain cooperation by amplifying the consequences of a single defection through a cascade of relationship losses. Building on Jackson et al. (2012), we introduce a novel robustness notion to characterize low cognitive…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Designing optimal interdependent networks is important for the robustness and efficiency of national critical infrastructures. Here, we establish a two-person game-theoretic model in which two network designers choose to maximize the global…
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
Consider spies infiltrating a network or dissidents secretly organising under a dictatorship. Such scenarios can be cast as adversarial social network analysis problems involving nodes connecting while evading network analysis tools, e.g.,…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
The problem of team formation in a social network asks for a set of individuals who not only have the required skills to perform a task but who can also communicate effectively with each other. Existing work assumes that all links in a…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at…
In this work we present a strategic network formation model predicting the emergence of multigroup structures. Individuals decide to form or remove links based on the benefits and costs those connections carry; we focus on bilateral consent…
We show a simple method for constructing an infinite family of graph formation games with link bias so that the resulting games admits, as a \textit{pairwise stable} solution, a graph with an arbitrarily specified degree distribution.…
Simple binary-state coordination models are widely used to study collective socio-economic phenomena such as the spread of innovations or the adoption of products on social networks. The common trait of these systems is the occurrence of…
We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism, and…