Related papers: A hybrid stochastic differential reinsurance and i…
This paper investigates the dynamic reinsurance design problem under the mean-variance criterion, incorporating heterogeneous beliefs between the insurer and the reinsurer, and introducing an incentive compatibility constraint to address…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…
We study a stochastic differential game in a ruin theoretic environment. In our setting two insurers compete for market share, which is represented by a joint performance functional. Consequently, one of the insurers strives to maximize it,…
In this article we consider a game theoretic approach to the Risk-Sensitive Benchmarked Asset Management problem (RSBAM) of Davis and Lleo \cite{DL}. In particular, we consider a stochastic differential game between two players, namely, the…
We study a reinsurer who faces multiple sources of model uncertainty. The reinsurer offers contracts to $n$ insurers whose claims follow compound Poisson processes representing both idiosyncratic and systemic sources of loss. As the…
Consider an insurance company exposed to a stochastic economic environment that contains two kinds of risk. The first kind is the insurance risk caused by traditional insurance claims, and the second kind is the financial risk resulting…
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…
This paper investigates a robust optimal consumption, investment, and reinsurance problem for an insurer with Epstein-Zin recursive preferences operating under model uncertainty. The insurer's surplus follows the diffusion approximation of…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
This paper studies a dynamic optimal reinsurance and dividend-payout problem for an insurance company in a finite time horizon. The goal of the company is to maximize the expected cumulative discounted dividend payouts until bankruptcy or…
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…
In this paper, we investigate a competitive market involving two agents who consider both their own wealth and the wealth gap with their opponent. Both agents can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system. Using United…
This paper considers an insurer with two collaborating business lines that faces three critical decisions: (1) dividend payout, (2) reinsurance coverage, and (3) capital injection between the lines, in the presence of model uncertainty. The…
This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio…
This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a necessary maximum principle and sufficient…
Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
This paper studies optimal insurance design under asymmetric information in a Stackelberg framework, where a monopolistic insurer faces uncertainty about both the insured's risk attitude, captured by a risk-aversion parameter, and the…