Related papers: Attacking quantum key distribution by light inject…
We consider the security of a system of quantum key distribution (QKD) using only practical devices. Currently, attenuated laser pulses are widely used and considered to be the most practical light source. For the receiver of photons,…
Like all of quantum information theory, quantum cryptography is traditionally based on two level quantum systems. In this letter, a new protocol for quantum key distribution based on higher dimensional systems is presented. An experimental…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols enable two distant parties to communicate with information-theoretically proven secrecy. However, these protocols are generally vulnerable to potential mismatches between the physical modeling and…
A simple photon-number splitting attack is described which works on any lossy quantum key distribution system with a multi-photon source independently of the mean source photon number, and with no induced error rate. In particular, it…
In this paper, the systematisation and classification of modern quantum technologies of information security against cyber-terrorist attack are carried out. The characteristic of the basic directions of quantum cryptography from the…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Most currently used cryptographic tools for protecting data are based on certain computational assumptions, which makes them vulnerable with respect to technological and algorithmic developments, such as quantum computing. One existing…
Quantum key distribution, which allows two distant parties to share an unconditionally secure cryptographic key, promises to play an important role in the future of communication. For this reason such technique has attracted many…
The channel loss incurred in long-distance transmission places a significant burden on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems: they must defeat a passive eavesdropper who detects all the light lost in the quantum channel and does so without…
Several vulnerabilities of single photon detectors have recently been exploited to compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. In this letter we report the first proof-of-principle implementation of a new quantum key…
Quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution (QKD) have been the most successful applications of quantum information processing, highlighting the unique capability of quantum mechanics, through the no-cloning theorem, to protect the…
In this paper, we briefly show how the quantum key distribution with blind polarization bases [Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)] can be made secure against the invisible photon attack.
Floodlight quantum key distribution (FL-QKD) is a radically different QKD paradigm that can achieve Gbit/s secret-key rates over metropolitan area distances without multiplexing [Phys. Rev. A 94, 012322 (2016)]. It is a two-way protocol…
Quantum key distribution systems offer cryptographic security, provided that all their components are thoroughly characterised. However, certain components might be vulnerable to a laser-damage attack, particularly when attacked at…
We propose a new quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on the fully quantum mechanical states of the Faraday rotators. The protocol is unconditionally secure against collective attacks for multi-photon source up to two photons on a…
Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we…
Quantum communications promise to revolutionise the way information is exchanged and protected. Unlike their classical counterpart, they are based on dim optical pulses that cannot be amplified by conventional optical repeaters.…
In network coding, we discuss the effect of sequential error injection on information leakage. We show that there is no improvement when the operations in the network are linear operations. However, when the operations in the network…
We describe a cryptographic protocol in which Wheeler's delayed choice experiment is used to generate the key distribution. The protocol, which uses photons polarized only along one axis, is secure against general attacks.
The role of the side channels in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution is studied. It is shown how the information leakage through a side channel from the trusted sender station increases the vulnerability of the protocols to the…