Related papers: Intelligence in Strategic Games
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…
Game theory is an established branch of mathematics that offers a rich set of mathematical tools for multi-person strategic decision making that can be used to model the interactions of decision makers in security problems who compete for…
Gaming environments are popular testbeds for studying human interactions and behaviors in complex artificial intelligence systems. Particularly, in multiplayer online battle arena (MOBA) games, individuals collaborate in virtual…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
This is a short introduction to the subject of strategic games. We focus on the concepts of best response, Nash equilibrium, strict and weak dominance, and mixed strategies, and study the relation between these concepts in the context of…
Delegation allows an agent to request that another agent completes a task. In many situations the task may be delegated onwards, and this process can repeat until it is eventually, successfully or unsuccessfully, performed. We consider…
Transactions are an important aspect of human social life, and represent dynamic flow of information, intangible values, such as trust, as well as monetary and social capital. Although much research has been conducted on the nature of…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a…
This paper studies incomplete-information games in which an information provider, an oracle, publicly discloses information to the players. One oracle is said to dominate another if, in every game, it can replicate the equilibrium outcomes…
We present an algorithm that identifies the reasoning patterns of agents in a game, by iteratively examining the graph structure of its Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID) representation. If the decision of an agent participates in no…
Cognitive abilities, such as Theory of Mind (ToM), play a vital role in facilitating cooperation in human social interactions. However, our study reveals that agents with higher ToM abilities may not necessarily exhibit better cooperative…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
In this study, we define interaction components of different orders between two input variables based on game theory. We further prove that interaction components of different orders satisfy several desirable properties.
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…
We introduce a new semantical formalism for logics of imperfect information, based on Game Logic (and, in particular, on van Benthem, Ghosh and Lu's Concurrent Dynamic Game Logic). This new kind of semantics combines aspects from game…
We investigate the dynamics of the choice of an active strategy in the minority game. A history distribution is introduced as an analytical tool to study the asymmetry between the two choices offered to the agents. Its properties are…