Related papers: Causal Games and Causal Nash Equilibrium

Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…

In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests, but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic model, aiming to describe game…

Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector probability matrix formalism that can cope with quantum as well as classical strategies. An analysis of classical and quantum strategy in a multi-sector extension of the…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…

In nature and society problems arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile, which are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume uncorrelated games, a more detailed modeling is necessary to consider the…

Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

Many multi-agent interaction scenarios can be naturally modeled as noncooperative games, where each agent's decisions depend on others' future actions. However, deploying game-theoretic planners for autonomous decision-making requires a…

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner's dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD…

We study the problem of agent selection in causal strategic learning under multiple decision makers and address two key challenges that come with it. Firstly, while much of prior work focuses on studying a fixed pool of agents that remains…

A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash…

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria…

Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…

We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…