Related papers: Strategic Coalitions in Stochastic Games
We introduce Value Coalition Logic, a typed assignment-based reconstruction of classical coalition logic. The strategic semantics is unchanged: coalitional ability is still interpreted by the standard one-step game-form clause. The change…
We study the mathematical properties of bilateral state-based modal logic (BSML), a modal logic employing state-based semantics (also known as team semantics), which has been used to account for free choice inferences and related linguistic…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
Model checking of strategic abilities is a notoriously hard problem, even more so in the realistic case of agents with imperfect information, acting in a stochastic environment. Assume-guarantee reasoning can be of great help here,…
Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the…
n infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as…
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…
Advancing our understanding of human behavior hinges on the ability of theories to unveil the mechanisms underlying such behaviors. Measuring the ability of theories and models to predict unobserved behaviors provides a principled method to…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
This paper studies the optimization of strategies in the context of possibly randomized two players zero-sum games with incomplete information. We compare 5 algorithms for tuning the parameters of strategies over a benchmark of 12 games. A…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…
Achieving seamless coordination in cooperative games is a crucial challenge in artificial intelligence, particularly when players operate under incomplete information. While communication helps, it is not always feasible. In this paper, we…
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In two recent papers, Li and Ju argued that generally, concurrent game models, models of Coalition Logic, have three too strong assumptions: seriality,…
We present a novel variant of fictitious play dynamics combining classical fictitious play with Q-learning for stochastic games and analyze its convergence properties in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our dynamics involves players…