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We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…
Cooperative Parrondo's games on a regular two dimensional lattice are analyzed based on the computer simulations and on the discrete-time Markov chain model with exact transition probabilities. The paradox appears in the vicinity of the…
Bayesian networks and their accompanying graphical models are widely used for prediction and analysis across many disciplines. We will reformulate these in terms of linear maps. This reformulation will suggest a natural extension, which we…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
We construct games of chance from simpler games of chance. We show that it may happen that the simpler games of chance are fair or unfavourable to a player andyet the new combined game is favourable -- this is a counter-intuitive…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
There is growing recognition that the network structures arising from interactions between different entities in physical, social and biological systems fundamentally alter the evolutionary outcomes. Previous paradigm exploring evolutionary…
In social dilemmas, most interactions are transient and susceptible to restructuring, leading to continuous changes in social networks over time. Typically, agents assess the rewards of their current interactions and adjust their…
We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a…
An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for the probability distribution of the one-dimensional cooperative Parrondo's games. We show that winning and the occurrence of the paradox depends on the number of players. Analytical…
Parrondo's paradox is a well-known counterintuitive phenomenon, where the combination of unfavorable situations can establish favorable ones. In this paper, we study one-dimensional discrete-time quantum walks, manipulating two different…
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents (cooperation or defection) feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum,…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
We pursue the possible connections between classical games and quantum computation. The Parrondo game is one in which a random combination of two losing games produces a winning game. We introduce novel realizations of this Parrondo effect…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…
Microscopic strategy update rules play an important role in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation among interacting agents on complex networks. Many previous related works only consider one \emph{fixed} rule, while in the real world,…
Toral (2002) considered an ensemble of N\geq2 players. In game B a player is randomly selected to play Parrondo's original capital-dependent game. In game A' two players are randomly selected without replacement, and the first transfers one…