Related papers: The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Market…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
It has been assumed that arbitrage profits are not possible in efficient markets, because future prices are not predictable. Here we show that predictability alone is not a sufficient measure of market efficiency. We instead propose to…
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
Financial markets are subject to long periods of polarized behavior, such as bull-market or bear-market phases, in which the vast majority of market participants seem to almost exclusively choose one action (between buying or selling) over…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
Prediction markets suffer from reduced liquidity and price accuracy for long-horizon events due to the opportunity cost of committed capital. Recently, major platforms have introduced interest-bearing positions to mitigate this…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We study a version of the minority game in which one agent is allowed to join the game in a random fashion. It is shown that in the crowded regime, i.e., for small values of the memory size $m$ of the agents in the population, the agent…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and…
Machine learning algorithms are increasingly used to make or support decisions in a wide range of settings. With such expansive use there is also growing concern about the fairness of such methods. Prior literature on algorithmic fairness…
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
We demonstrate that minority mechanisms arise in the dynamics of markets because of effects of price impact; accordingly the relative importance of minority and delayed majority mechanisms depends on the frequency of trading. We then use…