Related papers: Side-Channel Hardware Trojan for Provably-Secure S…
This paper reports a novel approach that uses transistor aging in an integrated circuit (IC) to detect hardware Trojans. When a transistor is aged, it results in delays along several paths of the IC. This increase in delay results in timing…
The global semiconductor supply chain involves design and fabrication at various locations, which leads to multiple security vulnerabilities, e.g., Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Although most HTs target digital circuits, HTs can be…
As the semiconductor industry has shifted to a fabless paradigm, the risk of hardware Trojans being inserted at various stages of production has also increased. Recently, there has been a growing trend toward the use of machine learning…
Due to the current horizontal business model that promotes increasing reliance on untrusted third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs), CAD tools, and design facilities, hardware Trojan attacks have become a serious threat to the…
Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…
To reduce the cost of ICs and to meet the market's demand, a considerable portion of manufacturing supply chain, including silicon fabrication, packaging and testing may be pushed offshore. Utilizing a global IC manufacturing supply chain,…
As industry moves toward chiplet-based designs, the insertion of hardware Trojans poses a significant threat to the security of these systems. These systems rely heavily on cache coherence for coherent data communication, making coherence…
Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The…
Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify the variations in their physical…
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have become a major concern to the security community due to their non-invasive feature, low-cost, and effectiveness in extracting secret information from hardware implementation of cryto algorithms.…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channel information through their power supplies when implemented on a physical platform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker to extract the secret…
Hardware Trojans (HTs) threaten the trust and reliability of integrated circuits (ICs), particularly when triggered HTs remain dormant during standard testing and activate only under rare conditions. Existing electromagnetic (EM)…
Due to the globalization of semiconductor manufacturing and test processes, the system-on-a-chip (SoC) designers no longer design the complete SoC and manufacture chips on their own. This outsourcing of the design and manufacturing of…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…
The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated circuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in different premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks,…