Related papers: Information Design in Spatial Resource Competition

We consider a multi-agent delegation mechanism without money. In our model, given a set of agents, each agent has a fixed number of solutions which is exogenous to the mechanism, and privately sends a signal, e.g., a subset of solutions, to…

This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for selling the item. In his seminal work, Myerson (1981) shows how to…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…

We develop an integrated framework for information design and mechanism design in screening environments with quasilinear utility. Using the tools of majorization theory and quantile functions, we show that both information design and…

How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system jointly controlled by a designer and one or more agents, where the designer can influence the agents' actions through selective information disclosure. At each time step, the…

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…

We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…

We study mechanism design settings where the planner has an interest in agents receiving noisy signals about the types of other agents. We show that additional information about other agents can eliminate undesired equilibria, making it…

Traditional approaches to the design of multi-agent navigation algorithms consider the environment as a fixed constraint, despite the obvious influence of spatial constraints on agents' performance. Yet hand-designing improved environment…

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search…

Competition for a limited resource is the hallmark of many complex systems, and often, that resource turns out to be the physical space itself. In this work, we study a novel model designed to elucidate the dynamics and emergence in complex…

For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent community is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simulations. The individual decisions are based on different local information…

We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…

When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…