Related papers: New Attacks and Defenses for Randomized Caches

The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…

Randomizing the mapping of addresses to cache entries has proven to be an effective technique for hardening caches against contention-based attacks like Prime+Prome. While attacks and defenses are still evolving, it is clear that randomized…

We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…

Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…

In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…

The aggressive performance optimizations in modern microprocessors can result in security vulnerabilities. For example, timing-based attacks in processor caches can steal secret keys or break randomization. So far, finding cache-timing…

Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…

The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controlled-channel attacks abuses page-table modifications to…

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…

Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…

The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…

High access frequency of certain rows in the DRAM may cause data loss in cells of physically adjacent rows due to crosstalk. The malicious exploit of this crosstalk by repeatedly accessing a row to induce this effect is known as row…

This paper presents two attack strategies designed to evade detection in ADMM-based systems by preventing significant changes to the residual during the attacked iteration. While many detection algorithms focus on identifying false data…

Microarchitectural attacks are a significant concern, leading to many hardware-based defense proposals. However, different defenses target different classes of attacks, and their impact on each other has not been fully considered. To raise…

Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…

Many micro-architectural attacks rely on the capability of an attacker to efficiently find small eviction sets: groups of virtual addresses that map to the same cache set. This capability has become a decisive primitive for cache…

Recent studies highlighting the vulnerability of computer architecture to information leakage attacks have been a cause of significant concern. Among the various classes of microarchitectural attacks, cache timing channels are especially…

Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…

In spam and malware detection, attackers exploit randomization to obfuscate malicious data and increase their chances of evading detection at test time; e.g., malware code is typically obfuscated using random strings or byte sequences to…

Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…