Related papers: Robust countermeasure against detector control att…
Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of QKD systems. Even though no complete QKD system has been hacked yet, it is nevertheless important to consider…
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution provides a theoretical unconditionally secure solution to distribute symmetric keys among users in a communication network. However, the practical devices used to implement these systems are…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector's vulnerabilities…
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding…
We developed a countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background noise cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Background noise cancellation includes self-differencing and balanced…
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD). Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However,…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
Security of an ideal system for quantum key distribution can be formally proved. However, technological imperfections of real systems can be misused by an eavesdropper to get information about the key without causing a detectable change in…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
We demonstrate a practical countermeasure against a well-known class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that exploit detection efficiency mismatch, where the receiver's detectors do not exhibit identical responses to…
A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original…
We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise security of quantum key distribution. Although our system…
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing…
To improve the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, high speed, low dark count single photon detectors (or low noise homodyne detectors) are required. However, in practice, a fast detector is usually noisy. Here, we…
We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. This attack strategy takes advantage of a generic vulnerability of homodyne receivers: a…
To the active basis choice decoy state quantum key distribution systems with detector efficiency mismatch, we present a modified attack strategy, which is based on faked states attack, with quantum nondemolition measurement ability to…
In a practical CVQKD system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the…
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely…
The security proof of continuous variable quantum key distribution(CV QKD) based on two assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions maybe invalid in practice…