Related papers: Multiagent Evaluation under Incomplete Information
Reinforcement learning from self-play has recently reported many successes. Self-play, where the agents compete with themselves, is often used to generate training data for iterative policy improvement. In previous work, heuristic rules are…
Pommerman is a multi-agent environment that has received considerable attention from researchers in recent years. This environment is an ideal benchmark for multi-agent training, providing a battleground for two teams with communication…
This letter studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in partially observable Markov potential games. Solving this problem is challenging due to partial observability, decentralized information, and the curse of dimensionality. First, to…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
Robots and autonomous systems must interact with one another and their environment to provide high-quality services to their users. Dynamic game theory provides an expressive theoretical framework for modeling scenarios involving multiple…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…
This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of…
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…
Global games form a subclass of games with incomplete information where a set of agents decide actions against a regime with an underlying fundamental $\theta$ representing its power. Each agent has access to an independent noisy…
We consider seeking a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a monotone game, played by dynamic agents which are modeled as a class of lower-triangular nonlinear uncertain dynamics with external disturbances. We establish a general framework that…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities as autonomous agents, yet existing benchmarks either focus on single-agent tasks or are confined to narrow domains, failing to capture the dynamics of multi-agent coordination…
Competitive non-cooperative online decision-making agents whose actions increase congestion of scarce resources constitute a model for widespread modern large-scale applications. To ensure sustainable resource behavior, we introduce a novel…
In mobile robotics and autonomous driving, it is natural to model agent interactions as the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative, dynamic game. These methods inherently rely on observations from sensors such as lidars and cameras to…
Responsibility allocation -- determining the extent to which agents are accountable for outcomes -- is a fundamental challenge in the design and analysis of multi-agent systems. In this work, we model such systems as concurrent stochastic…
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learning robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information games, where the joint reward could depend on the uncertain opponent type (a private information known only to the opponent itself…
To achieve general intelligence, agents must learn how to interact with others in a shared environment: this is the challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). The simplest form is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where…
Multi-agent systems are prevalent in a wide range of domains including power systems, vehicular networks, and robotics. Two important problems to solve in these types of systems are how the intentions of non-coordinating agents can be…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…