Related papers: Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions

Walrasian equilibrium prices can be said to coordinate markets: They support a welfare optimal allocation in which each buyer is buying bundle of goods that is individually most preferred. However, this clean story has two caveats. First,…

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…

Double auctions are widely used in financial markets, such as those for stocks, derivatives, currencies, and commodities, to match demand and supply. Once all buyers and sellers have placed their trade requests, the exchange determines how…

In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…

Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…

We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, $K$ identical units of a good are sold to a group of buyers that have valuations…

We address the challenging problem of dynamically pricing complementary items that are sequentially displayed to customers. An illustrative example is the online sale of flight tickets, where customers navigate through multiple web pages.…

We consider assortment and inventory planning problems with dynamic stockout-based substitution effects, and without replenishment, in two different settings: (1) Customers can see all available products when they arrive, a typical scenario…

Online Resource Allocation addresses the problem of efficiently allocating limited resources to buyers with incomplete knowledge of future requests. In our setting, buyers arrive sequentially requesting a set of items, each with a value…

We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…

We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…

When calibrating spatial partial equilibrium models with conjectural variations, some modelers fit the suppliers' sales to the available data in addition to total consumption and price levels. While this certainly enhances the quality of…

We study an assortment optimization problem under a multi-purchase choice model in which customers choose a bundle of up to one product from each of two product categories. Different bundles have different utilities and the bundle price is…

We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We…

In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. However, most of the state-of-the-art auction…

In display advertising, a small group of sellers and bidders face each other in up to 10 12 auctions a day. In this context, revenue maximisation via monopoly price learning is a high-value problem for sellers. By nature, these auctions are…

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…

Strategic product placement can have a strong influence on customer purchase behavior in physical stores as well as online platforms. Motivated by this, we consider the problem of optimizing the placement of substitutable products in…

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…