Related papers: Double-oracle sampling method for Stackelberg Equi…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
A central task of artificial intelligence is the design of artificial agents that act towards specified goals in partially observed environments. Since such environments frequently include interaction over time with other agents with their…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…
Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…
The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…
In this paper, we consider a sequential stochastic Stackelberg game with two players, a leader and a follower. The follower has access to the state of the system while the leader does not. Assuming that the players act in their respective…