Related papers: Zero-sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Informat…

We study zero-sum stochastic differential games where the state dynamics of the two players is governed by a generalized McKean-Vlasov (or mean-field) stochastic differential equation in which the distribution of both state and controls of…

Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…

In stochastic games with stage duration h, players act at times 0, h, 2h, and so on. The payoff and leaving probabilities are proportional to h. As h approaches 0, such discrete-time games approximate games played in continuous time. The…

We present a fast numerical algorithm for large scale zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information, which combines policy iteration and algebraic multigrid methods. This algorithm can be applied either to a true finite state space…

We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start…

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…

We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…

We study $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches $0$ (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage duration $h$, players…

We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…

Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…

We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…

This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

Information gathering while interacting with other agents under sensing and motion uncertainty is critical in domains such as driving, service robots, racing, or surveillance. The interests of agents may be at odds with others, resulting in…

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions,…

We investigate a linear quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind turbine farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount performance with a non-constant rate. Our…

We consider the behaviour of $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches 0 (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage…

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid development of quantum information processing, a new paradigm which studies the power and limit of "quantum advantages" in various information processing tasks. Problems such as when quantum…