Related papers: Secure Analysis of Dynamic Networks under Pinning …
We explored the Patrol Security Game (PSG), a robotic patrolling problem modeled as an extensive-form Stackelberg game, where the attacker determines the timing, location, and duration of their attack. Our objective is to devise a…
Resource allocation takes place in various types of real-world complex systems such as urban traf- fic, social services institutions, economical and ecosystems. Mathematically, the dynamical process of complex resource allocation can be…
In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…
Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only…
In various online/offline multi-agent networked environments, it is very popular that the system can benefit from coordinating actions of two interacting agents at some cost of coordination. In this paper, we first formulate an optimization…
We investigate the synchronization features of a network of spiking neurons under a distance-dependent coupling following a power-law model. The interplay between topology and coupling strength leads to the existence of different…
We develop investment approaches to secure electric power systems against load attacks where a malicious intruder (the attacker) covertly changes reactive power setpoints of loads to push the grid towards voltage instability while the…
Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…
This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…
Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A central component of this problem is how defensive resources…
Computer network defence is a complicated task that has necessitated a high degree of human involvement. However, with recent advancements in machine learning, fully autonomous network defence is becoming increasingly plausible. This paper…
Pinning control of a complex network aims at forcing the states of all nodes to track an external signal by controlling a small number of nodes in the network. In this paper, an algebraic graph-theoretic condition is introduced to optimize…
Despite the advantage of preserving data privacy, federated learning (FL) still suffers from the straggler issue due to the limited computing resources of distributed clients and the unreliable wireless communication environment. By…
Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…
We develop some basic principles for the design and robustness analysis of a continuous-time bilinear dynamical network, where an attacker can manipulate the strength of the interconnections/edges between some of the agents/nodes. We…
We consider the problem of aggregating data in a dynamic graph, that is, aggregating the data that originates from all nodes in the graph to a specific node, the sink. We are interested in giving lower bounds for this problem, under…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Most Vital Links problem, modeled as a one-round adversarial game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker strategically removes up to $k$ edges from a flow network to maximally…
This paper studies the problem of designing networks that are strong structurally controllable, and robust simultaneously. For given network specifications, including the number of nodes $N$, the number of leaders $N_L$, and diameter $D$,…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…