Related papers: SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Truste…

As an emerging technique for confidential computing, trusted execution environment (TEE) receives a lot of attention. To better develop, deploy, and run secure applications on a TEE platform such as Intel's SGX, both academic and industrial…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are hardware-enforced memory isolation units, emerging as a pivotal security solution for security-critical applications. TEEs, like Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, allow the isolation of confidential code…

Enclaves, such as those enabled by Intel SGX, offer a powerful hardware isolation primitive for application partitioning. To become universally usable on future commodity OSes, enclave designs should offer compatibility with existing…

Encrypted database systems provide a great method for protecting sensitive data in untrusted infrastructures. These systems are built using either special-purpose cryptographic algorithms that support operations over encrypted data, or by…

Memory disaggregation via CXL enables multi-host resource sharing. However, existing CXL sharing mechanisms enforce coarse-grained, host-level permissions only, leaving isolation to the operating system. Today, virtual memory enables…

The growth of cloud computing has revolutionized data processing and storage capacities to another levels of scalability and flexibility. But in the process, it has created a huge challenge of security, especially in terms of safeguarding…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…

Authenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important computing paradigm for cloud applications ranging from big-data outsourcing, to cryptocurrency and certificate transparency log. These modern applications increasingly…

A smart contract on a blockchain cannot keep a secret because its data is replicated on all nodes in a network. To remedy this problem, it has been suggested to combine blockchains with trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel…

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol has become an integral part of modern Internet technology. Currently, it is the primary protocol for commercialized web applications. It can provide a fast, secure connection with a…

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…

We present a practical framework to deploy privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) applications in untrusted clouds based on a trusted execution environment (TEE). Specifically, we shield unmodified PyTorch ML applications by running…

Stream processing systems are important in modern applications in which data arrive continuously and need to be processed in real time. Because of their resource and scalability requirements, many of these systems run on the cloud, which is…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a cornerstone for securing sensitive computations by providing isolated enclaves protected from untrusted software. However, their security guarantees are undermined by vulnerabilities…

Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves. Such…

Mitigating memory-access attacks on the Intel SGX architecture is an important and open research problem. A natural notion of the mitigation is cache-miss obliviousness which requires the cache-misses emitted during an enclave execution are…

Trusted-execution environments (TEE), like Intel SGX, isolate user-space applications into secure enclaves without trusting the OS. Thus, TEEs reduce the trusted computing base, but add one to two orders of magnitude slow-down. The…

The kernels of operating systems such as Windows, Linux, and MacOS are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking. Defenses exist, but many require efficient intra-address-space isolation. Execute-only memory, for example, requires read…