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Propelled by the growth of large-scale blockchain deployments, much recent progress has been made in designing sharding protocols that achieve throughput scaling linearly in the number of nodes. However, existing protocols are not robust to…
This paper studies a fundamental problem regarding the security of blockchain PoW consensus on how the existence of multiple misbehaving miners influences the profitability of selfish mining. Each selfish miner (or attacker interchangeably)…
We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of {\em stake pools}\ in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain.…
As the applications of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) in wireless communications grow, sensitivity of DRL based wireless communication strategies against adversarial attacks has started to draw increasing attention. In order to address…
Bitcoin is a "crypto currency", a decentralized electronic payment scheme based on cryptography. Bitcoin economy grows at an incredibly fast rate and is now worth some 10 billions of dollars. Bitcoin mining is an activity which consists of…
Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is central to aligning Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it introduces a critical vulnerability: an imperfect Reward Model (RM) can become a single point of failure when it fails to penalize…
The selfish mining attack, arguably the most famous game-theoretic attack in blockchain, indicates that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. Most subsequent works mainly focus on strengthening the selfish mining strategy, thus…
Mining for Bitcoins is a high-risk high-reward activity. Miners, seeking to reduce their variance and earn steadier rewards, collaborate in pooling strategies where they jointly mine for Bitcoins. Whenever some pool participant is…
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to attacks that inject poisoned passages into the retrieved context, even at low corruption rates. We show that existing attacks are not designed to be stealthy, allowing reliable…
Proof-of-Work mining is intended to provide blockchains with robustness against double-spend attacks. However, an economic analysis that follows from Budish (2018), which considers free entry conditions together with the ability to rent…
Cryptocurrencies have gained popularity due to their transparency, security, and accessibility compared to traditional financial systems, with Bitcoin, introduced in 2009, leading the market. Bitcoin's security relies on blockchain…
In most popular public accessible cryptocurrency systems, the mining pool plays a key role because mining cryptocurrency with the mining pool turns the non-profitable situation into profitable for individual miners. In many recent novel…
We introduce an online learning algorithm for computing adaptive resource allocation policies against strategic ecological adversaries with unknown behavioral models and partial observability. Our setting addresses a fundamental limitation…
In general-sum games, the interaction of self-interested learning agents commonly leads to socially worse outcomes, such as defect-defect in the iterated stag hunt (ISH). Previous works address this challenge by sharing rewards or shaping…
Federated learning is vulnerable to various attacks, such as model poisoning and backdoor attacks, even if some existing defense strategies are used. To address this challenge, we propose an attack-adaptive aggregation strategy to defend…
Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of…
Mining attacks aim to gain an unfair share of extra rewards in the blockchain mining. Selfish mining can preserve discovered blocks and strategically release them, wasting honest miners' computing resources and getting higher profits.…
A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish mining - deviate from the protocol to…
In this paper we revisit the mining strategies in proof of work based cryptocurrencies and propose two strategies, we call smart and smarter mining, that in many cases strictly dominate honest mining. In contrast to other known attacks,…
We study selfish mining in Ethereum. The problem is combinatorially more complex than in Bitcoin because of major differences in the reward system and a different difficulty adjustment formula. Equivalent strategies in Bitcoin do have…