Related papers: Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games
Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…
Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…
Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing…
The extensive-form game has been studied considerably in recent years. It can represent games with multiple decision points and incomplete information, and hence it is helpful in formulating games with uncertain inputs, such as poker. We…
We analyze the problem of computing a correlated equilibrium that optimizes some objective (e.g., social welfare). Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] gave a sufficient condition for the tractability of this problem; however, this…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
The sequence form, owing to its compact and holistic strategy representation, has demonstrated significant efficiency in computing normal-form perfect equilibria for two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Nevertheless, the…
We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…
We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
We show that computing approximate stationary Markov coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in general-sum stochastic games is computationally intractable, even when there are two players, the game is turn-based, the discount factor is an…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from…
In this paper, we study the problem of multiple stochastic agents interacting in a dynamic game scenario with continuous state and action spaces. We define a new notion of stochastic Nash equilibrium for boundedly rational agents, which we…
We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…
A key challenge of evolutionary game theory and multi-agent learning is to characterize the limit behavior of game dynamics. Whereas convergence is often a property of learning algorithms in games satisfying a particular reward structure…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
The phenomenon of group cooperation constitutes a fundamental mechanism underlying various social and biological systems. Complex networks provide a structural framework for group interactions, where individuals can not only obtain…
Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…