Related papers: Teleportation-based collective attacks in Gaussian…
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the…
The security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem, which implies that an eavesdropper copying transmitted qubits in unknown states causes their disturbance. Nevertheless, in real cryptographic systems some level…
We present here an information theoretic study of Gaussian collective attacks on the continuous variable key distribution protocols based on Gaussian modulation of coherent states. These attacks, overlooked in previous security studies,…
In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a simple attack of…
A continuous key distribution scheme is proposed that relies on a pair of canonically conjugate quantum variables. It allows two remote parties to share a secret Gaussian key by encoding it into one of the two quadrature components of a…
Research on optimal eavesdropping models under practical conditions will help to evaluate realistic risk when employing quantum key distribution (QKD) system for secure information transmission. Intuitively, fiber loss will lead to the…
We investigate the connection between the optimal collective eavesdropping attack and the optimal cloning attack where the eavesdropper employs an optimal cloner to attack the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The analysis is done in…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security…
The Gaussian quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states and heterodyne detection [Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504 (2004)] has the advantage that no active random basis switching is needed on the receiver's side. Its security is,…
We consider two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution, studying its security against general eavesdropping strategies. Assuming the asymptotic limit of many signals exchanged, we prove that two-way Gaussian protocols are immune…
A fully general approach to the security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is presented. Provided that the quantum channel is estimated via the covariance matrix of the quadratures, Gaussian attacks are shown…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source…
We analyze the security of two-way quantum key distribution using arbitrary finite-dimensional systems, considering both individual and collective eavesdropping attacks, without the effective use of entangled states, by incorporating two…
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of…
A general study of arbitrary finite-size coherent attacks against continuous-variable quantum cryptographic schemes is presented. It is shown that, if the size of the blocks that can be coherently attacked by an eavesdropper is fixed and…
We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…
We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to…
We investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on a quantum key distribution network by local sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks by the eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a pure two-qubit state shared between two parties…