Related papers: Realistic versus Rational Secret Sharing
Providing commons in the risky world is crucial for human survival, however, suffers more from the "free-riding" problem. Here, we proposed a solution that limits the access of the resource to an agent and tested its efficiency with a novel…
In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms have limited information about each other's…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…
Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides an efficient method for encoding a secret of arbitrary length $\ell$ among any $N \leq 2^\ell$ players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i) the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not…
Secret-key generation exploiting the channel reciprocity between two legitimate parties is an interesting alternative solution to cryptographic primitives for key distribution in wireless systems as it does not rely on an access…
The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection…
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another---if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…
Quantum secret sharing is a scheme for encoding a quantum state (the secret) into multiple shares and distributing them among several participants. If a sufficient number of shares are put together, then the secret can be fully…
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice…
Sender-receiver games are simple models of information transmission that provide a formalism to study the evolution of honest signaling and deception between a sender and a receiver. In many practical scenarios, lies often affect groups of…
Understanding how cooperation emerges in public goods games is crucial for addressing societal challenges. While optional participation can establish cooperation without identifying cooperators, it relies on specific assumptions -- that…
Cryptographic approaches, such as secure multiparty computation, can be used to compute in a secure manner the function of a distributed graph without centralizing the data of each participant. However, the output of the protocol itself can…
Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans don't always choose to observe others, since social learning can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
We consider a secret-sharing model where a dealer distributes the shares of a secret among a set of participants with the constraint that only predetermined subsets of participants must be able to reconstruct the secret by pooling their…
We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…
We generalize secret-sharing models that rely on correlated randomness and public communication, originally designed for a fixed access structure, to support a sequence of dynamic access structures, which we term an Additive Access…
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…
Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full…