Related papers: Positional Voting and Doubly Stochastic Matrices

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…

In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that…

We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to…

We study stochastic resonance in an over-damped approximation of the stochastic Duffing oscillator from a random dynamical systems point of view. We analyse this problem in the general framework of random dynamical systems with a…

Determinantal point processes have arisen in diverse settings in recent years and have been investigated intensively. We study basic combinatorial and probabilistic aspects in the discrete case. Our main results concern relationships with…

What payoffs are positionally determined for deterministic two-player antagonistic games on finite directed graphs? In this paper we study this question for payoffs that are continuous. The main reason why continuous positionally determined…

We compare the notions "Decisiveness" and "Success" for certain weighted voting systems and various underlying voting measures. In particular, we compute the success rate for the Shapley-Shubik meassure and, more generally, for Common…

We present a new family of deep neural network-based dynamic systems. The presented dynamics are globally stable and can be conditioned with an arbitrary context state. We show how these dynamics can be used as structured robot policies.…

In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…

This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. The idea is to represent the grades of each voter on d candidates as a point in R^d and to define the winner of the vote using the deepest point of the…

Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…

In this paper we study various properties of finite stochastic systems or hidden Markov chains as they are alternatively called. We discuss their construction following different approaches and we also derive recursive filtering formulas…

We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…

We study a generalization of conditional probability for arbitrary ordered vector spaces. A related problem is that of assigning a numerical value to one vector relative to another. We characterize the groups for which these generalized…

We describe the fundamental constructions and properties of determinantal probability measures and point processes, giving streamlined proofs. We illustrate these with some important examples. We pose several general questions and…

This paper proposes a voting process in which voters allocate fractional votes to their expected utility in different domains: over proposals, other participants, and sets containing proposals and participants. This approach allows for a…

In this note, we present an algorithm that yields many new methods for constructing doubly stochastic and symmetric doubly stochastic matrices for the inverse eigenvalue problem. In addition, we introduce new open problems in this area that…

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…

We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take…

The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attracted much attention in several disciplines. Theoretical decision models have been proposed which vary in their assumptions on the sophistication of the voters and on…