Related papers: Third person enforcement in a prisoner's dilemma g…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
Research has shown that the addition of abstention as an option transforms social dilemmas to rock-paper-scissor type games, where defectors dominate cooperators, cooperators dominate abstainers (loners), and abstainers (loners), in turn,…
In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on cooperation…
The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma…
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy…
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
We considered a three-strategy game with the characteristics of the prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt games. This game was inspired by recent experimental studies that elucidated the role of individual solutions. People who adopt individual…
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
Game theory is fundamental to understanding cooperation between agents. Mainly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known model that has been extensively studied in complex networks. However, although the emergence of cooperation has been…
Costly punishment has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in one-shot games. However, recent studies have revealed that the effectiveness of costly punishment can be diminished by second-order free riders (i.e.,…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
The standard iterated prisoner's dilemma is an unrealistic model of social behaviour because it forces individuals to participate in the interaction. We analyse a model in which players have the option of ending their association. If the…
In this paper we address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner's dilemma game as metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule…
Strategic decision making involves affective and cognitive functions like reasoning, cognitive and emotional empathy which may be subject to age and gender differences. However, empathy-related changes in strategic decision-making and their…