Related papers: Leader-Follower Network Aggregative Game with Stoc…

This paper considers a conjecture-based distributed learning approach that enables autonomous nodes to independently optimize their transmission probabilities in random access networks. We model the interaction among multiple…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for two-network zero-sum games with set constraints, where the two networks have the opposite nonsmooth cost functions. The interaction of the agents in each network…

Often adaptive, distributed control can be viewed as an iterated game between independent players. The coupling between the players' mixed strategies, arising as the system evolves from one instant to the next, is determined by the system…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed online generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) learning for multi-cluster games with delayed feedback information. Specifically, each agent in the game is assumed to be informed a sequence of local…

One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…

We study a distributed approach for seeking a Nash equilibrium in $n$-cluster games with strictly monotone mappings. Each player within each cluster has access to the current value of her own smooth local cost function estimated by a…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

In this paper, we consider the problem of containment control of multi-agent systems with multiple stationary leaders, interacting over a directed network. While, containment control refers to just ensuring that the follower agents reach…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…

We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main contribution is…

Wireless power charging enables portable devices to be permanently unplugged. Due to its low transmission power and low transmission efficiency, it requires much longer time slot to charge users compared with that for data transmission in…

This paper considers the privacy-preserving Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design for a class of networked aggregative games, in which the players' objective functions are considered to be sensitive information to be protected. In…

In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…

The decision making and management of many engineering networks involves multiple parties with conflicting interests, while each party is constituted with multiple agents. Such problems can be casted as a multi-cluster game. Each cluster is…

This paper is concerned with a leader-follower problem for a multi-agent system with a switching interconnection topology. Distributed observers are designed for the second-order follower-agents, under the common assumption that the…

This paper delves into the investigation of a distributed aggregative optimization problem within a network. In this scenario, each agent possesses its own local cost function, which relies not only on the local state variable but also on…