Related papers: Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…
We consider the problem of prediction by a machine learning algorithm, called learner, within an adversarial learning setting. The learner's task is to correctly predict the class of data passed to it as a query. However, along with queries…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…
In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quantum indeterminacy of a decision-maker's beliefs, a feature that has been proposed as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a…
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…
We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…
Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…
We study sequential language games in which two players, each with private information, communicate to achieve a common goal. In such games, a successful player must (i) infer the partner's private information from the partner's messages,…
Strategic interactions ranging from politics and pharmaceuticals to e-commerce and social networks support equilibria in which agents with private information manipulate others which are vulnerable to deception. Especially in cyberspace and…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
User preference learning is generally a hard problem. Individual preferences are typically unknown even to users themselves, while the space of choices is infinite. Here we study user preference learning from information-theoretic…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
Solutions to pursuit-evasion and surveillance-evasion differential games are typically computed and expressed using open-loop representations, with the synthesis of feedback strategies significantly less common. We propose a numerical…
We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…
Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price…