Related papers: Payment Networks as Creation Games
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
It is an important decision-making problem for a miner in the blockchain networks if he/she participates in the mining so that he/she earns a reward by creating a new block earlier than other miners. We formulate this decision-making…
We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of $\alpha$, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges…
The Bitcoin Lightning Network is a layer 2 protocol designed to facilitate fast and inexpensive Bitcoin transactions. It operates by establishing channels between users, where Bitcoin is locked and transactions are conducted off-chain until…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
Scaling blockchain efficiency is crucial to its widespread usage in which the payment channel is one of the most prominent approaches. With payment channels and the network they construct, two users can move some transactions off-chain in a…
Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price \alpha > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game,…
Major cryptocurrency networks have relied on random peering choice rules for making connections in their peer-to-peer networks. Generally, these choices have good properties, particularly for open, permissionless networks. Random peering…
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter…
The current framework of Internet interconnections, based on transit and settlement-free peering relations, has systemic problems that often cause peering disputes. We propose a new techno-economic interconnection framework called…
Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the…
In PCNs, nodes that forward payments between a source and a receiver are paid a small fee if the payment is successful. The fee is a compensation for temporarily committing funds to the payment. However, payments may fail due to…
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…
Studying the impact of cooperation in strategic settings is one of the cornerstones of algorithmic game theory. Intuitively, allowing more cooperation yields equilibria that are more beneficial for the society of agents. However, for many…
Off-chain transaction networks can mitigate the scalability issues of today's trustless electronic cash systems such as Bitcoin. However, these peer-to-peer networks also introduce a new attack surface which is not well-understood today.…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
Off-chain protocols (channels) are a promising solution to the scalability and privacy challenges of blockchain payments. Current proposals, however, require synchrony assumptions to preserve the safety of a channel, leaking to an adversary…
The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…
The payment channel, which allows two parties to perform micropayments without involving the blockchain, has become a promising proposal to improve the scalability of decentralized ledgers such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Payment channels have…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…