Related papers: Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Divi…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…

We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…

We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency to groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness requires…

Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…

We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…

We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…

House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…

With very few exceptions, recent research in fair division has mostly focused on deterministic allocations. Deviating from this trend, we study the fairness notion of interim envy-freeness (iEF) for lotteries over allocations, which serves…

We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…

We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…

We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…

Envy-freeness is one of the most prominent fairness concepts in the allocation of indivisible goods. Even though trivial envy-free allocations always exist, rich literature shows this is not true when one additionally requires some…

We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality…

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…

We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…

We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…

We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and equitability up to one good (EQ1) in…

The existence of allocations that are fair and efficient, simultaneously, is a central inquiry in fair division literature. A prominent result in discrete fair division shows that the complementary desiderata of fairness and efficiency can…