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We introduce and study the class of semidefinite games, which generalizes bimatrix games and finite $N$-person games, by replacing the simplex of the mixed strategies for each player by a slice of the positive semidefinite cone in the space…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
In this report, some properties of the set of Nash equilibria (NEs) of $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games are reviewed. In particular, the cardinality of the set of NEs is given in terms of the entries of the payoff matrix. Moreover, closed-form…
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $N$-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From…
We prove that there exists a constant $\epsilon>0$ such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (nXn) game requires quasi-polynomial time,…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
We identify structural assumptions which provide solvability of the Nash system arising from a linear-quadratic closed-loop game, with stable properties with respect to the number of players. In a setting of interactions governed by a…
We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…
We consider the problem of computing a mixed-strategy generalized Nash equilibrium (MS-GNE) for a class of games where each agent has both continuous and integer decision variables. Specifically, we propose a novel Bregman…
We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…
We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming problems and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP)s. We remark that, when addressing bilevel problems, we consider the general case in which the lower level program is not…
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…
We study natural improvement dynamics in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of maximum degree $d\geq 1$. We focus on two problems regarding the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable…
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…