Related papers: Optimal auctions for networked markets with extern…
This paper proposes a novel approach to resilient distributed optimization with quadratic costs in a networked control system (e.g., wireless sensor network, power grid, robotic team) prone to external attacks (e.g., hacking, power outage)…
We study deregulated power markets with strategic power suppliers. In deregulated markets, each supplier submits its supply function (i.e., the amount of electricity it is willing to produce at various prices) to the independent system…
In most OTC markets, a small number of market makers provide liquidity to other market participants. More precisely, for a list of assets, they set prices at which they agree to buy and sell. Market makers face therefore an interesting…
Convergence (virtual) bidding is an important part of two-settlement electric power markets as it can effectively reduce discrepancies between the day-ahead and real-time markets. Consequently, there is extensive research into the bidding…
In order to deal with market power that sporadically results from contingencies (e.g., severe weather, plant outages) most electricity markets have institutions in charge of monitoring market performance and mitigating market power. The…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
According to common understanding, in free completion of a private product, market and price, the two main factors in the competition that leads to economic efficiency, always exist together. This paper, however, points out the phenomenon…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory,…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
We analyze a model of selling a single object to a principal-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The principal and the agent have different assessments of the object's value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants: they propose prices at which they stand ready to buy and sell a wide variety of assets. They face a complex optimization problem with both static and dynamic components. They…
Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally…
A platform commits to a search algorithm that maps prices to search order. Given this algorithm, sellers set prices, and consumers engage in sequential search. This framework generalizes the ordered search literature. We introduce a special…
This paper proposes a market clearing mechanism for energy trading in a local transactive market, where each player can participate in the market as seller or buyer and tries to maximize its welfare individually. Market players send their…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
With the rapid development of distributed energy resources, increasing number of residential and commercial users have been switched from pure electricity consumers to prosumers that can both consume and produce energy. To properly manage…
The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for efficient coupling of independent electricity markets. The…