Related papers: Splitting necklaces, with constraints
This article deals with the cake cutting problem. In this setting, there exists two notions of fair division: proportional division (when there are n players, each player thinks to get at least 1/n of the cake) and envy-free division (each…
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…
We consider the problem of partitioning an undirected graph (representing a social network) over $n$ nodes and max degree $\Delta$ into $k$ equally sized parts. Each node in the graph, representing an agent, derives utility proportional to…
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the…
In contrast to the classical cake-cutting problem (how to fairly divide a desirable object), "chore division" is the problem of how to divide an undesirable object. We develop the first explicit algorithm for envy-free chore division among…
We treat problems of fair division, their various interconnections, and their relations to Sperner's lemma and the KKM theorem as well as their variants. We prove extensions of Alon's necklace splitting result in certain regimes and relate…
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…
We prove several results addressing the envy-free division problem in the presence of an unpredictable (secretive) player, called the "dragon". There are two basic scenarios. 1. There are $r-1$ players and a dragon. Once the "cake" is…
The classical cake cutting problem studies how to find fair allocations of a heterogeneous and divisible resource among multiple agents. Two of the most commonly studied fairness concepts in cake cutting are proportionality and…
We study the consensus-halving problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of $n$ agents has equal valuation for the two portions. The $\epsilon$-approximate consensus-halving problem allows each agent to have an…
We prove a common generalization to several mass partition results using hyperplane arrangements to split $\mathbb{R}^d$ into two sets. Our main result implies the ham-sandwich theorem, the necklace splitting theorem for two thieves, a…
The necklace splitting problem is a classic problem in fair division with many applications, including data-informed fair hash maps. We extend necklace splitting to a dynamic setting, allowing for relocation, insertion, and deletion of…
The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…
We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…