Related papers: Maya: Falsifying Power Sidechannels with Dynamic C…

Microelectronic systems are widely used in many sensitive applications (e.g., manufacturing, energy, defense). These systems increasingly handle sensitive data (e.g., encryption key) and are vulnerable to diverse threats, such as, power…

Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code.…

Deep neural networks are becoming popular and important assets of many AI companies. However, recent studies indicate that they are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks can be either white-box or black-box. The…

Mobile devices often distribute measurements from physical sensors to multiple applications using software multiplexing. On Android devices, the highest requested sampling frequency is returned to all applications, even if others request…

We consider the secure communication problem for broadcasting of two encrypted sources. The sender wishes to broadcast two secret messages via two common key cryptosystems. We assume that the adversary can use the side-channel, where the…

Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…

Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The…

Performing a comprehensive side-channel analysis evaluation of small embedded devices is a process known for its variability and complexity. In real-world experimental setups, the results are largely influenced by a huge amount of…

Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive…

Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…

The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…

Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…

Lightweight cryptography is a novel diversion from conventional cryptography that targets internet-of-things (IoT) platform due to resource constraints. In comparison, it offers smaller cryptographic primitives such as shorter key sizes,…

Side channels represent a broad class of security vulnerabilities that have been demonstrated to exist in many applications. Because completely eliminating side channels often leads to prohibitively high overhead, there is a need for a…

Consider a stochastic process being controlled across a communication channel. The control signal that is transmitted across the control channel can be replaced by a malicious attacker. The controller is allowed to implement any arbitrary…

Artificial Intelligence (AI) hardware accelerators have been widely adopted to enhance the efficiency of deep learning applications. However, they also raise security concerns regarding their vulnerability to power side-channel attacks…

In-memory computing (IMC) systems have great potential for accelerating data-intensive tasks such as deep neural networks (DNNs). As DNN models are generally highly proprietary, the neural network architectures become valuable targets for…

Attestation is a strong tool to verify the integrity of an untrusted system. However, in recent years, different attacks have appeared that are able to mislead the attestation process with treacherous practices as memory copy, proxy, and…

Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum…