Related papers: Optimal Bi-level Lottery Design for Multi-agent Sy…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…
Social utility maximization refers to the process of allocating resources in such a way that the sum of agents' utilities is maximized under the system constraints. Such allocation arises in several problems in the general area of…
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…
We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…
This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
In this paper, we investigate the noncooperative games of multi-agent systems. Different from existing noncooperative games, our formulation involves the high-order nonlinear dynamics of players, and the communication topologies among…
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…