Related papers: Contract Design with Costly Convex Self-Control

We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…

A company provides a service at different time slots, each slot being endowed with a capacity. A non-atomic population of users is willing to purchase this service. The population is modeled as a continuous measure over the preferred times.…

We consider the framework of convex high dimensional stochastic control problems, in which the controls are aggregated in the cost function. As first contribution, we introduce a modified problem, whose optimal control is under some…

This paper investigates the moral hazard problem in finite horizon with both continuous and lump-sum payments, involving a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent and a standard utility maximiser principal. Building upon the so-called dynamic…

According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…

We consider the problem of controlling an unknown linear dynamical system in the presence of (nonstochastic) adversarial perturbations and adversarial convex loss functions. In contrast to classical control, the a priori determination of an…

Dynamic facility location problems predominantly suppose a monopoly over the service or product provided. Nonetheless, this premise can be a severe oversimplification in the presence of market competitors, as customers may prefer facilities…

We revisit two classical problems: the determination of the law of the underlying with respect to a risk-neutral measure on the basis of option prices, and the pricing of options with convex payoffs in terms of prices of call options with…

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…

We study an online dynamic pricing problem where the potential demand at each time period $t=1,2,\ldots, T$ is stochastic and dependent on the price. However, a perishable inventory is imposed at the beginning of each time $t$, censoring…

While attracting attention is one of the prime goals of content providers, the conversion of that attention into revenue is by no means obvious. Given that most users expect to consume web content for free, a provider with an established…

This paper investigates large-population stochastic control problems in which agents share their state information and cooperate to minimize a convex cost functional. The latter is decomposed into individual and coupling costs, with the…

We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers…

Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher…

This paper studies the provision of a wireless network by a monopolistic provider who may be either benevolent (seeking to maximize social welfare) or selfish (seeking to maximize provider profit). The paper addresses questions that do not…

In this paper we provide a complete theoretical analysis of a two-dimensional degenerate non convex singular stochastic control problem. The optimisation is motivated by a storage-consumption model in an electricity market, and features a…

We consider the decentralized control of a discrete-time time-varying linear system subject to additive disturbances and polyhedral constraints on the state and input trajectories. The underlying system is composed of a finite collection of…

Networking companies, especially the ones with the biggest market shares, tend to offer end to end solutions for their customers, with large discounts, that it would sound irrational to decline such offers, helping contractors make larger…

We investigate an optimal reinsurance problem for an insurance company facing a constant fixed cost when the reinsurance contract is signed. The insurer needs to optimally choose both the starting time of the reinsurance contract and the…

We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly…