Related papers: Optimal mechanisms with budget for user generated …
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
A distributed machine learning platform needs to recruit many heterogeneous worker nodes to finish computation simultaneously. As a result, the overall performance may be degraded due to straggling workers. By introducing redundancy into…
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
A key aspect of many resource allocation problems is the need for the resource controller to compute a function, such as the max or arg max, of the competing users metrics. Information must be exchanged between the competing users and the…
The problem of distributed rate maximization in multi-channel ALOHA networks is considered. First, we study the problem of constrained distributed rate maximization, where user rates are subject to total transmission probability…
In the online multiple knapsack problem, an algorithm faces a stream of items, and each item has to be either rejected or stored irrevocably in one of $n$ bins (knapsacks) of equal size. The gain of an~algorithm is equal to the sum of sizes…
Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of…
Web 3.0 represents the next generation of the Internet, which is widely recognized as a decentralized ecosystem that focuses on value expression and data ownership. By leveraging blockchain and artificial intelligence technologies, Web 3.0…
A left-corner parsing algorithm with top-down filtering has been reported to show very efficient performance for unification-based systems. However, due to the nontermination of parsing with left-recursive grammars, top-down constraints…
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods…
Optimization models have been broadly used within side the energy industry as useful decision-making systems for scheduling and dispatching electric powered energy resources; this is applied in a system called unit commitment (UC). Unit…
We consider the distributed optimization problem for a multi-agent system. Here, multiple agents cooperatively optimize an objective by sharing information through a communication network and performing computations. In this tutorial, we…
We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and must be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably.…
We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We consider allocation of a resource to multiple interested users with a constraint that if the resource is allocated to user $i$ then it can not be allocated simultaneously to a predefined set of users $\cS_i$ . This scenario arises in…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…