Related papers: Assortment planning for two-sided sequential match…
We study sequential multi-issue trading between two greedily rational agents who exchange resources from a finite set of categories. Each agent's utility depends on its allocation, but the offering agent does not know the responding agent's…
Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…
In the basic recommendation paradigm, the most (predicted) relevant item is recommended to each user. This may result in some items receiving lower exposure than they "should"; to counter this, several algorithmic approaches have been…
Our work introduces the effect of supply/demand imbalances into the literature on online matching with stochastic rewards in bipartite graphs. We provide a parameterized definition that characterizes instances as over- or undersupplied (or…
Service platforms must determine rules for matching heterogeneous demand (customers) and supply (workers) that arrive randomly over time and may be lost if forced to wait too long for a match. Our objective is to maximize the cumulative…
Algorithmic monoculture arises when many decision-makers rely on the same algorithm to evaluate applicants. An emerging body of work investigates possible harms of this kind of homogeneity, but has been limited by the challenge of…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
In the rapidly evolving landscape of retail, assortment planning plays a crucial role in determining the success of a business. With the rise of sponsored products and their increasing prominence in online marketplaces, retailers face new…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the…
Matching demand (riders) to supply (drivers) efficiently is a fundamental problem for ride-sharing platforms who need to match the riders (almost) as soon as the request arrives with only partial knowledge about future ride requests. A…
This paper aims to investigate and achieve seller-side fairness within online marketplaces, where many sellers and their items are not sufficiently exposed to customers in an e-commerce platform. This phenomenon raises concerns regarding…
E-commerce marketplaces provide business opportunities to millions of sellers worldwide. Some of these sellers have special relationships with the marketplace by virtue of using their subsidiary services (e.g., fulfillment and/or shipping…
Can competition among misaligned AI providers yield aligned outcomes for a diverse population of users, and what role does model personalization play? We study a setting where multiple competing AI providers interact with multiple users who…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
We consider a sequential blocked matching (SBM) model where strategic agents repeatedly report ordinal preferences over a set of services to a central planner. The planner's goal is to elicit agents' true preferences and design a policy…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…