Related papers: Characterising Probabilistic Alternating Simulatio…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
In this paper, we present a probabilistic adaptation of an Assume/Guarantee contract formalism. For the sake of generality, we assume that the extended state machines used in the contracts and implementations define sets of runs on a given…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
We consider multi-agent systems where agents actions and beliefs are determined aleatorically, or "by the throw of dice". This system consists of possible worlds that assign distributions to independent random variables, and agents who…
A cellular game is a dynamical system in which cells, placed in some discrete structure, are regarded as playing a game with their immediate neighbors. Individual strategies may be either deterministic or stochastic. Strategy success is…
This paper deals with the probabilistic behaviours of distributed systems described by a process calculus considering both probabilistic internal choices and nondeterministic external choices. For this calculus we define and study a typing…
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…
Reliability analysis is a sub-field of uncertainty quantification that assesses the probability of a system performing as intended under various uncertainties. Traditionally, this analysis relies on deterministic models, where experiments…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
Predicting the evolution of a large system of units using its structure of interaction is a fundamental problem in complex system theory. And so is the problem of reconstructing the structure of interaction from temporal observations. Here,…
We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players' private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax…
The laws of chance are often subtle and deceptive. This is why games of chance work. People are convinced that they obey seemingly intuitive laws, while the underlying mathematical structure reveals a different and more complex reality.…
Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…
The paper uses a non-cooperative simultaneous game for coalition structure formation (Levando, 2016) to demonstrate some applications of the introduced game: a cooperation, a Bayesian game within a coalition with intra-coalition…
As autonomous agents become more ubiquitous, they will eventually have to reason about the plans of other agents, which is known as theory of mind reasoning. We develop a planning-as-inference framework in which agents perform nested…
Perfect synchronicity in $N$-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets are asynchronous by design, and yet most…
This paper makes a small step towards a non-stochastic version of superhedging duality relations in the case of one traded security with a continuous price path. Namely, we prove the coincidence of game-theoretic and measure-theoretic…
Examples of games between two partners with mixed strategies, calculated by the use of the probability amplitude as some vector in Hilbert space are given. The games are macroscopic, no microscopic quantum agent is supposed. The reason for…