Related papers: Systemic Risk and Heterogeneous Mean Field Type In…
One of the main challenges in distributed learning arises from the difficulty of handling heterogeneous local models and data. In light of the recent success of generative models, we propose to meet this challenge by building on the idea of…
We propose a dynamic mean field model for `systemic risk' in large financial systems, which we derive from a system of interacting diffusions on the positive half-line with an absorbing boundary at the origin. These diffusions represent the…
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
A group behavior of a heterogeneous multi-agent system is studied which obeys an "average of individual vector fields" under strong couplings among the agents. Under stability of the averaged dynamics (not asking stability of individual…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
In this paper we study the implications of contingent payments on the clearing wealth in a network model of financial contagion. We consider an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe financial contagion model in which the nominal interbank…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which…
In a probabilistic mean-field game driven by a linear diffusion an individual player aims to minimize an ergodic long-run cost by controlling the diffusion through a pair of -- increasing and decreasing -- c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…
This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with…
We consider a large random network, in which the performance of a node depends upon that of its neighbours and some external random influence factors. This results in random vector valued fixed-point (FP) equations in large dimensional…
Mean field game (MFG) systems consisting of a major agent and a large number of minor agents were introduced in (Huang, 2010) in an LQG setup. The Nash certainty equivalence was used to obtain a Markovian closed-loop Nash equilibrium for…
In this paper, we investigate a distributed Nash equilibrium computation problem for a time-varying multi-agent network consisting of two subnetworks, where the two subnetworks share the same objective function. We first propose a…
We develop a probabilistic framework to approximate Nash equilibria in symmetric $N$-player games in the large population regime, via the analysis of associated mean field games (MFGs). The approximation is achieved through the analysis of…
Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…
We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…
Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze…
In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of…
A modern version of Monetary Circuit Theory with a particular emphasis on stochastic underpinning mechanisms is developed. It is explained how money is created by the banking system as a whole and by individual banks. The role of central…