Related papers: Pricing in Resource Allocation Games Based on Lagr…
We consider the problem of assigning or allocating resources to a set of jobs. We consider the case when the resources are fungible, that is, the job can be done with any mix of the resources, but with different efficiencies. In our…
We present a general technique, based on a primal-dual formulation, for analyzing the quality of self-emerging solutions in weighted congestion games. With respect to traditional combinatorial approaches, the primal-dual schema has at least…
Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which was introduced by Rosenthal in 1973. In recent years, several extensions of these games were proposed to incorporate aspects that are not captured by the standard…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…
We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…
We study a game played between advertisers in an online ad platform. The platform sells ad impressions by first-price auction and provides autobidding algorithms that optimize bids on each advertiser's behalf, subject to advertiser…
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We introduce a game where players selfishly choose a resource and endure a cost depending on the number of players choosing nearby resources. We model the influences among resources by a weighted graph, directed or not. These games are…
Renewable resources are starting to constitute a growing portion of the total generation mix of the power system. A key difference between renewables and traditional generators is that many renewable resources are managed by individuals,…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds…
A power market with non-convexities may not have an equilibrium price for power that provides economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this case, the market players are entitled to receive the uplift payments that…
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…