Related papers: Uncovering Information Flow Policy Violations in C…

We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that transparently incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality and integrity policies on untrusted storage. Clio insulates developers from explicitly manipulating keys and…

We introduce a tool that supports continuous flow analysis in order to detect security problems as the user edits. The tool uses abstract interpretation over both byte codes and abstract syntax trees to trace the flow of both type…

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

In the standard web browser programming model, third-party scripts included in an application execute with the same privilege as the application's own code. This leaves the application's confidential data vulnerable to theft and leakage by…

Leakage of confidential information represents a serious security risk. Despite a number of novel, theoretical advances, it has been unclear if and how quantitative approaches to measuring leakage of confidential information could be…

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…

Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…

A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…

In security-critical software applications, confidential information must be prevented from leaking to unauthorized sinks. Static analysis techniques are widespread to enforce a secure information flow by checking a program after…

Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…

We may enforce an information flow policy by encrypting a protected resource and ensuring that only users authorized by the policy are able to decrypt the resource. In most schemes in the literature that use symmetric cryptographic…

Ensuring compliance of organizations to federal regulations is a growing concern. This paper presents a framework and methods to verify whether an implemented low-level security policy is compliant to a high-level security policy. Our…

We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input…

We propose a novel approach to improving software security called Cryptographic Path Hardening, which is aimed at hiding security vulnerabilities in software from attackers through the use of provably secure and obfuscated cryptographic…

Information flow analysis checks whether certain pieces of (confidential) data may affect the results of computations in unwanted ways and thus leak information. Dynamic information flow analysis adds instrumentation code to the target…

In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…

This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…

Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to divert program execution away from the…

Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…

The simple security property in an information flow policy can be enforced by encrypting data objects and distributing an appropriate secret to each user. A user derives a suitable decryption key from the secret and publicly available…