Related papers: Verifying that a compiler preserves concurrent val…

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent valuable intellectual property (IP), reflecting significant investments in training data, compute, and expertise. Deploying these models on partially trusted or insecure devices introduces substantial…

Memory corruption vulnerabilities are endemic to unsafe languages, such as C, and they can even be found in safe languages that themselves are implemented in unsafe languages or linked with libraries implemented in unsafe languages. Robust…

High assurance of information-flow security (IFS) for concurrent systems is challenging. A promising way for formal verification of concurrent systems is the rely-guarantee method. However, existing compositional reasoning approaches for…

(CROPPED TO FIT IN ARXIV'S SILLY LIMIT. SEE PDF FOR COMPLETE ABSTRACT.) We are the first to thoroughly explore a large space of formal secure compilation criteria based on robust property preservation, i.e., the preservation of properties…

Compartmentalization is good security-engineering practice. By breaking a large software system into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges, restricting their interactions to conform to well-defined interfaces, we…

Environmental noise (e.g.heat, ionized particles, etc.) causes transient faults in hardware, which lead to corruption of stored values. Mission-critical devices require such faults to be mitigated by fault-tolerance --- a combination of…

We provide simple equational principles for deriving rely-guarantee-style inference rules and refinement laws based on idempotent semirings. We link the algebraic layer with concrete models of programs based on languages and execution…

Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…

To ensure programs do not leak private data, we often want to be able to provide formal guarantees ensuring such data is handled correctly. Often, we cannot keep such data secret entirely; instead programmers specify how private data may be…

We address the problem of preserving non-interference across compiler transformations under speculative semantics. We develop a proof method that ensures the preservation uniformly across all source programs. The basis of our proof method…

Secure compilers generate compiled code that withstands many target-level attacks such as alteration of control flow, data leaks or memory corruption. Many existing secure compilers are proven to be fully abstract, meaning that they reflect…

We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which protect…

Deductive verification of concurrent programs under weak memory has thus far been limited to simple programs over a monolithic state space. For scalability, we also require modular techniques with verifiable library abstractions. This paper…

Program safety (i.e., absence of undefined behaviors) is critical for correct operation of computer systems. It is usually verified at the source level (e.g., by separation logics) and preserved to the target by verified compilers (e.g.,…

Automated program verifiers are often organized into a front-end, which encodes an input program into an intermediate verification language (IVL), and a back-end, which proves that the IVL program is correct. Soundness of such translational…

Bounded verification has proved useful to detect bugs and to increase confidence in the correctness of a program. In contrast to unbounded verification, reasoning about calls via (bounded) inlining and about loops via (bounded) unrolling…

Large language models (LLMs) have recently seen widespread adoption in both academia and industry. As these models grow, they become valuable intellectual property (IP), reflecting substantial investments by their owners. The high cost of…

In security-critical software applications, confidential information must be prevented from leaking to unauthorized sinks. Static analysis techniques are widespread to enforce a secure information flow by checking a program after…

We present an instrumenting compiler for enforcing data confidentiality in low-level applications (e.g. those written in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our approach, the programmer marks secret data by writing lightweight…

Bhat et al. developed an inductive compiler that computes density functions for probability spaces described by programs in a simple probabilistic functional language. In this work, we implement such a compiler for a modified version of…