Related papers: Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces is Hard
In this paper, we study the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC), where a solution is a stable matching or a report that none exists. We present a novel polynomial-time algorithm that can find a near-feasible stable matching…
We develop a framework to give upper bounds on the "practical" computational complexity of stability problems for a wide range of nonlinear continuous and hybrid systems. To do so, we describe stability properties of dynamical systems using…
In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem, Gale and Shapley describe an algorithm which finds a stable matching in $O(n^2)$ communication rounds. Their algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm where each…
In this study, we investigate a robust single-machine scheduling problem under processing time uncertainty. The uncertainty is modeled using the budgeted approach, where each job has a nominal and deviation processing time, and the number…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
We investigate determining the exact bounds of the frequencies of conjunctions based on frequent sets. Our scenario is an important special case of some general probabilistic logic problems that are known to be intractable. We show that…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or…
We study the following general stabbing problem from a parameterized complexity point of view: Given a set $\mathcal S$ of $n$ translates of an object in $\Rd$, find a set of $k$ lines with the property that every object in $\mathcal S$ is…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
Divorced individuals face complex situations when they have children with different ex-partners, or even more, when their new partners have children of their own. In such cases, and when kids spend every other weekend with each parent, a…
In this paper, we study robust transshipment under consistent flow constraints. We consider demand uncertainty represented by a finite set of scenarios and characterize a subset of arcs as so-called fixed arcs. In each scenario, we require…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
We consider the establishment of connections in survivable networks, where each connection is allocated with a working (primary) path and a protection (backup) path. While many optimal solutions have been found for the establishment of a…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…