Related papers: Dynamically Stable Matching
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise…
In this paper we provide a first-ever epistemic formulation of stabilizing agreement, defined as the non-terminating variant of the well established consensus problem. In stabilizing agreements, agents are given (possibly different) initial…
Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
Market-based coordination of demand side assets has gained great interests in recent years. In spite of its efficiency, there is a risk that the interaction between the dynamic assets through the price signal could result in an unstable…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
Many problems can be solved by iteration by multiple participants (processors, servers, routers etc.). Previous mathematical models for such asynchronous iterations assume a single function being iterated by a fixed set of participants. We…
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
The stability of money value is an important requisite for a functioning economy, yet it critically depends on the actions of participants in the market themselves. Here we model the value of money as a dynamical variable that results from…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
The stability analysis of socioeconomic systems has been centered on answering whether small perturbations when a system is in a given quantitative state will push the system permanently to a different quantitative state. However, typically…
The energy transition is expected to significantly increase the share of renewable energy sources whose production is intermittent in the electricity mix. Apart from key benefits, this development has the major drawback of generating a…
There has been a long-standing and at times fractious debate whether complex and large systems can be stable. In ecology, the so-called `diversity-stability debate' arose because mathematical analyses of ecosystem stability were either…
We consider a population of agents competing for finite resources using strategies based on two channels of signals. The model is applicable to financial markets, ecosystems and computer networks. We find that the dynamics of the system is…
Motivated by our collaboration with a major refugee resettlement agency in the U.S., we study a dynamic matching problem where each new arrival (a refugee case) must be matched immediately and irrevocably to one of the static resources (a…
This paper studies the (group) strategy-proofness aspect of two-sided matching markets under stability. For a one-to-one matching market, we show an equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability. We obtain this…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…