Related papers: Lower Bounds for Adversarially Robust PAC Learning
The standard definition of PAC learning (Valiant 1984) requires learners to succeed under all distributions -- even ones that are intractable to sample from. This stands in contrast to samplable PAC learning (Blum, Furst, Kearns, and Lipton…
Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings…
We investigate the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) property of scenario decision algorithms, which refers to their ability to produce decisions with an arbitrarily low risk of violating unknown safety constraints, provided a sufficient…
PAC-Bayesian learning bounds are of the utmost interest to the learning community. Their role is to connect the generalization ability of an aggregation distribution $\rho$ to its empirical risk and to its Kullback-Leibler divergence with…
In many learning theory problems, a central role is played by a hypothesis class: we might assume that the data is labeled according to a hypothesis in the class (usually referred to as the realizable setting), or we might evaluate the…
We study the problem of PAC learning $\gamma$-margin halfspaces in the presence of Massart noise. Without computational considerations, the sample complexity of this learning problem is known to be $\widetilde{\Theta}(1/(\gamma^2…
Machine Learning (ML) techniques can facilitate the automation of malicious software (malware for short) detection, but suffer from evasion attacks. Many studies counter such attacks in heuristic manners, lacking theoretical guarantees and…
Adversarial attacks during the testing phase of neural networks pose a challenge for the deployment of neural networks in security critical settings. These attacks can be performed by adding noise that is imperceptible to humans on top of…
We consider learning in an adversarial environment, where an $\varepsilon$-fraction of samples from a distribution $P$ are arbitrarily modified (global corruptions) and the remaining perturbations have average magnitude bounded by $\rho$…
Deep learning models are vulnerable to various adversarial manipulations of their training data, parameters, and input sample. In particular, an adversary can modify the training data and model parameters to embed backdoors into the model,…
Despite demonstrating superior rate-distortion (RD) performance, learning-based image compression (LIC) algorithms have been found to be vulnerable to malicious perturbations in recent studies. However, the adversarial attacks considered in…
It is well known that adversarial attacks can fool deep neural networks with imperceptible perturbations. Although adversarial training significantly improves model robustness, failure cases of defense still broadly exist. In this work, we…
Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both adversarial and clean examples, is one of the most trusted defense methods against adversarial attacks. However, there are three major practical difficulties in implementing and…
Over recent years, devising classification algorithms that are robust to adversarial perturbations has emerged as a challenging problem. In particular, deep neural nets (DNNs) seem to be susceptible to small imperceptible changes over test…
Backdoor attacks inject poisoning samples during training, with the goal of forcing a machine learning model to output an attacker-chosen class when presented a specific trigger at test time. Although backdoor attacks have been demonstrated…
Ideally, what confuses neural network should be confusing to humans. However, recent experiments have shown that small, imperceptible perturbations can change the network prediction. To address this gap in perception, we propose a novel…
Despite extraordinary progress, current machine learning systems have been shown to be brittle against adversarial examples: seemingly innocuous but carefully crafted perturbations of test examples that cause machine learning predictors to…
The vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks to Adversarial Attacks has fuelled research towards building robust models. While most Adversarial Training algorithms aim at defending attacks constrained within low magnitude Lp norm bounds,…
In this paper, we study fast training of adversarially robust models. From the analyses of the state-of-the-art defense method, i.e., the multi-step adversarial training, we hypothesize that the gradient magnitude links to the model…
Adversarial training aims to defend against adversaries: malicious opponents whose sole aim is to harm predictive performance in any way possible. This presents a rather harsh perspective, which we assert results in unnecessarily…