Related papers: Polymorphic Relaxed Noninterference
Information-flow security type systems ensure confidentiality by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively declassify information about private data.…
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…
Protecting confidential data from leaking is a critical challenge in computer systems, particularly given the growing number of observers on the internet. Therefore, limiting information flow using robust security policies becomes…
Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…
In automated complexity analysis, noninterference-based type systems statically guarantee, via soundness, the property that well-typed programs compute functions of a given complexity class, e.g., the class FP of functions computable in…
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced…
Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…
Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…
Language-based information flow control (IFC) enables reasoning about and enforcing security policies in decentralized applications. While information flow properties are relatively extensional and compositional, designing expressive…
We propose a type system to analyze the time consumed by multi-threaded imperative programs with a shared global memory, which delineates a class of safe multi-threaded programs. We demonstrate that a safe multi-threaded program runs in…
Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…
Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…
Subtyping, also known as subtype polymorphism, is a concept extensively studied in programming language theory, delineating the substitutability relation among datatypes. This property ensures that programs designed for supertype objects…
Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…
Choreographies describe distributed protocols from a global viewpoint, enabling correct-by-construction synthesis of local behaviours. We develop a policy-parametric type system that prevents information leaks from high-security data to…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On…
Noninterference provides a control over information flow in a system for ensuring confidentiality and integrity properties. In the literature this notion has been well studied as transitive noninterference and intransitive noninterference.…
This work provides a study to demonstrate the potential of using off-the-shelf programming languages and their theories to build sound language-based-security tools. Our study focuses on information flow security encompassing…
Temporal epistemic logic is a well-established framework for expressing agents knowledge and how it evolves over time. Within language-based security these are central issues, for instance in the context of declassification. We propose to…