Related papers: Network Formation under Random Attack and Probabil…
In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) where palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits in the PD. When a new node is attached, the node make linkes to…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
We study the dynamics of opinions in a setting where a leader has a payoff that depends on agents' beliefs and where agents derive psychological utility from their beliefs. Agents sample a signal that maximises their utility and then…
In this paper, I characterize the network formation process as a static game of incomplete information, where the latent payoff of forming a link between two individuals depends on the structure of the network, as well as private…
Using the minority game as a model for competition dynamics, we investigate the effects of inter-agent communications on the global evolution of the dynamics of a society characterized by competition for limited resources. The agents…
The power of networks manifests itself in a highly non-linear amplification of a number of effects, and their weakness - in propagation of cascading failures. The potential systemic risk effects can be either exacerbated or mitigated,…
We study the mean field approximation of a recent model of cascades on networks relevant to the investigation of systemic risk control in financial networks. In the model, the hypothesis of a trend reinforcement in the stochastic process…
Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore how the welfare outcomes of a coordination game depend on…
Consider a setting where $N$ players, partitioned into $K$ observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over…
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
In this paper, we design a greedy routing on networks of mobile agents. In the greedy routing algorithm, every time step a packet in agent $i$ is delivered to the agent $j$ whose distance from the destination is shortest among searched…
We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. They weigh these actions according the strengths of their…
We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…
In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013). The cost…
Three models of growing random networks with fitness dependent growth rates are analysed using the rate equations for the distribution of their connectivities. In the first model (A), a network is built by connecting incoming nodes to nodes…
With the passage of time, the development of communication technology and transportation broke the isolation among people. Relationship tends to be complicated, pluralism, dynamism. In the network where interpersonal relationship and…
We study epidemic spreading processes in large networks, when the spread is assisted by a small number of external agents: infection sources with bounded spreading power, but whose movement is unrestricted vis-\`a-vis the underlying network…
We highlight intriguing features of complex networks that are grown by \emph{redirection}. In this mechanism, a target node is chosen uniformly at random from the pre-existing network nodes and the new node attaches either to this initial…
The main problem we address in this paper is whether function determines form when a society of agents organizes itself for some purpose or whether the organizing method is more important than the functionality in determining the structure…