Related papers: Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility under Par…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
We establish and analyze a service center location model with a simple but novel decision-dependent demand induced from a maximum attraction principle. The model formulations are investigated in the distributionally-robust optimization…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
Strategic product placement can have a strong influence on customer purchase behavior in physical stores as well as online platforms. Motivated by this, we consider the problem of optimizing the placement of substitutable products in…
In this paper, we introduce a new variant of the $p$-median facility location problem in which it is assumed that the exact location of the potential facilities is unknown. Instead, each of the facilities must be located in a region around…
This article describes a model and an exact solution method for facility location problems with decision-dependent uncertainties. The model allows characterizing the probability distribution of the random elements as a function of the…
A number of prototypical optimization problems in multi-agent systems (e.g., task allocation and network load-sharing) exhibit a highly local structure: that is, each agent's decision variables are only directly coupled to few other agent's…
Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning the input, usually referred to as prediction. The goal is to…
We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design perspective. The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which…
In this paper, we introduce and study the Facility Location Problem with Aleatory Agents (FLPAA), where the facility accommodates n agents larger than the number of agents reporting their preferences, namely n_r. The spare capacity is used…
We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Facility Location problems ask to place facilities in a way that optimizes a given objective function so as to provide a service to all clients. These are one of the most well-studied optimization problems spanning many research areas such…
Dynamic facility location problems predominantly suppose a monopoly over the service or product provided. Nonetheless, this premise can be a severe oversimplification in the presence of market competitors, as customers may prefer facilities…
In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The price of the service at each location depends on…
Our work is devoted to the metric facility location problem and addresses the selfish behavior of the players. It contributes to the line of work initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [EC09] on approximate mechanism design without money.…
This paper investigates mechanism design for congested facility location problems, where agents are partitioned into groups with conflicting interests (e.g., competition for booking a basketball court in a gymnasium), and each agent's cost…
Designing strategyproof mechanisms for multi-facility location that optimize social costs based on agent preferences had been challenging due to the extensive domain knowledge required and poor worst-case guarantees. Recently, deep learning…