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We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with $n$ agents and $m$ goods, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in…
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open…
Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive…
We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive…
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since ancient times, with most of the early mathematical work on the problem focusing on resources that are infinitely divisible. Over the last decade, there…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…
We study fair allocation of indivisible items, where the items are furnished with a set of conflicts, and agents are not permitted to receive conflicting items. This kind of constraint captures, for example, participating in events that…
We consider allocations of a set of $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents of equal entitlements that have valuations from the class XOS. A previous sequence of works showed allocations that obtain an $\alpha$-approximation for the maximin…
We study the problem of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among a set of agents. We focus on the graphical valuation model, previously studied by Christodolou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair…
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game…
We consider the problem of online assignment of indivisible chores under \MMS\ criteria. The previous work proves that any deterministic online algorithm for chore division has a competitive ratio of at least 2. In this work, we improve…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We study the fair division of indivisible items. In the general model, the goal is to allocate $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents while satisfying fairness criteria such as MMS, EF1, and EFX. We also study a recently-introduced graphical…
We consider the fair division of indivisible items using the maximin shares measure. Recent work on the topic has focused on extending results beyond the class of additive valuation functions. In this spirit, we study the case where the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating indivisible, mixed-manna items. For basic measures of fairness, this problem is hard in general. Thus, research has flourished concerning input classes where efficient algorithms…
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences,…
A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a single item. While an EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation of…
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the egalitarian social cost in the fair division of chores. The…