Related papers: Leaking Information Through Cache LRU States
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains including healthcare, legal services, and confidential communications, where privacy is paramount. This paper introduces Whisper Leak, a side-channel attack that…
Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…
Caches have been exploited to leak secret information due to the different times they take to handle memory accesses. Cache timing attacks include non-speculative cache side and covert channel attacks and cache-based speculative execution…
This work presents, to the best of our knowledge of the literature, the first analytic model to address the performance of an LRU (Least Recently Used) implementing cache under non-stationary traffic conditions, i.e., when the popularity of…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Flushing the cache, using instructions like clflush and wbinvd, is commonly proposed as a countermeasure against access-based cache attacks. In this report, we show that several Intel caches, specifically the L1 caches in some pre-Skylake…
When studying the information leakage in programs or protocols, a natural question arises: "what is the worst case scenario?". This problem of identifying the maximal leakage can be seen as a channel capacity problem in the information…
An attacker can gain information of a user by analyzing its network traffic. The size of transferred data leaks information about the file being transferred or the service being used, and this is particularly revealing when the attacker has…
Last level caches (LLCs) occupy a large chip-area and there size is expected to grow further to offset the limitations of memory bandwidth and speed. Due to high leakage consumption of SRAM device, caches designed with SRAM consume large…
In this paper, we reveal the existence of a new class of prefetcher, the XPT prefetcher, in the modern Intel processors which has never been officially documented. It speculatively issues a load, bypassing last-level cache (LLC) lookups,…
Attacks like Spectre abuse speculative execution, one of the key performance optimizations of modern CPUs. Recently, several testing tools have emerged to automatically detect speculative leaks in commercial (black-box) CPUs. However, the…
To efficiently scale data caching infrastructure to support emerging big data applications, many caching systems rely on consistent hashing to group a large number of servers to form a cooperative cluster. These servers are organized…
Modern processors utilize an increasingly large register set to facilitate efficient floating point and SIMD computation. This large register set is a burden for operating systems, as its content needs to be saved and restored when the…
We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…
Modern multicore processors are employing large last-level caches, for example Intel's E7-8800 processor uses 24MB L3 cache. Further, with each CMOS technology generation, leakage energy has been dramatically increasing and hence, leakage…
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…
Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect…
Modern distributed storage systems often use erasure codes to protect against disk and node failures to increase reliability, while trying to meet the latency requirements of the applications and clients. Storage systems may have caches at…
As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core…
Timing side-channels are an important threat to cryptography that still needs to be addressed in implementations, and the advent of post-quantum cryptography raises this issue because the lattice-based schemes may produce secret-dependent…