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Data analysis and monitoring on smart grids are jeopardized by attacks on cyber-physical systems. False data injection attack (FDIA) is one of the classes of those attacks that target the smart measurement devices by injecting malicious…
This paper addresses the challenge of amplitude-unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We introduce a resilient tube-based model predictive control…
Recent studies have considered thwarting false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in power grids by proactively perturbing branch susceptances. This approach is known as moving target defense (MTD). However, despite of…
The rise of cyber-security concerns has brought significant attention to the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Among the various types of cyberattacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and false data injection (FDI)…
The cybersecurity of microgrid has received widespread attentions due to the frequently reported attack accidents against distributed energy resource (DER) manufactures. Numerous impact mitigation schemes have been proposed to reduce or…
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…
The security of energy supply in a power grid critically depends on the ability to accurately estimate the state of the system. However, manipulated power flow measurements can potentially hide overloads and bypass the bad data detection…
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical control based DC microgrid (DCmG) equipped with unknown input observer (UIO) based detectors, where the potential false data injection (FDI) attacks and the distributed countermeasure are…
Real time operation of the power grid and synchronism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent…
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…
Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be…
Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack…
This paper presents a hybrid data-driven physics model-based framework for real time monitoring in smart grids. As the power grid transitions to the use of smart grid technology, it's real time monitoring becomes more vulnerable to cyber…
Modern electric power grid, known as the Smart Grid, has fast transformed the isolated and centrally controlled power system to a fast and massively connected cyber-physical system that benefits from the revolutions happening in the…
Recently, moving target defence (MTD) has been proposed to thwart false data injection (FDI) attacks in power system state estimation by proactively triggering the distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. One of the…
False data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on power systems can be prevented by strategically selecting and protecting a sufficiently large measurement subset, which, however, requires adequate cyber-defense resources for measurement…
This paper introduces a novel two-stage framework for online mitigation of False Data Injection (FDI) signals to improve the resiliency of Networked Control Systems (NCSs) and ensure their safe operation in the presence of malicious…
A new mechanism aimed at misleading a power system control center about the source of a data attack is proposed. As a man-in-the-middle state attack, a data framing attack is proposed to exploit the bad data detection and identification…
State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate…
The reliable operation of power grid is supported by energy management systems (EMS) that provide monitoring and control functionalities. Contingency analysis is a critical application of EMS to evaluate the impacts of outages and prepare…